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Abstract
The selection of climate policies should be an exercise in risk management reflecting the many relevant
sources of uncertainty. Studies of climate change and its impacts rarely yield consensus on the
distribution of exposure, vulnerability or possible outcomes. Hence policy analysis cannot effectively
evaluate alternatives using standard approaches, such as expected utility theory and benefit-cost
analysis. This Perspective highlights the value of robust decision-making tools designed for situations
such as evaluating climate policies, where consensus on probability distributions is not available and
stakeholders differ in their degree of risk tolerance. A broader risk-management approach enables a
range of possible outcomes to be examined, as well as the uncertainty surrounding their likelihoods.
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Preface
The selection of climate policies should be an exercise in risk management reflecting the many
relevant sources of uncertainty. Studies of climate change and its impacts rarely yield consensus
on the distribution of exposure, vulnerability, or possible outcomes. Hence policy analysis
cannot effectively evaluate alternatives using standard approaches such as expected utility theory
and benefit-cost analysis. This Perspective highlights the value of robust decision-making tools
designed for situations, such as evaluating climate policies, where generally agreed-upon
probability distributions are not available and stakeholders differ in their degree of risk tolerance.
This broader risk management approach enables one to examine a range of possible outcomes
and the uncertainty surrounding their likelihoods.

Introduction
The scientific understanding of climate change and its impacts has increased dramatically in
recent years, but several interacting sources of uncertainty mean that future climate change and
its impacts will not be known with precision for the foreseeable future. Some uncertainties
involve the path of global socioeconomic development, the way it affects the commitment by
countries to use energy efficient technologies and how greenhouse gas emissions might respond
to specific climate-related policies. Other uncertainties involve internal variability and
incomplete understanding of the climate system and broader Earth-system feedbacks. Still other
uncertainties involve the way that changes in climate translate to impacts such as changes in
water availability, agricultural production, sea level rise, or heat waves in different parts of the
world. A final set involves the evolution of assets at risk (exposure) both in physical and in
monetary terms and the level of protection that can be undertaken to reduce their vulnerability to
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potential losses (i.e., adaptation measures). The implication of these interacting sources of
uncertainty is that choosing among climate policies is intrinsically an exercise in risk
management.
A principal purpose of risk management is to evaluate strategies for responding to an uncertain
threat. To illustrate this point in the context of a simple example, consider a coastal community
in Florida deciding whether land 3 meters above sea level is a suitable location for construction
of a new residential development to be occupied for most of the current century. Suppose that the
best estimate of the maximum storm surge plus sea level rise over this period is 2 meters. In this
case, the project looks safe. But if there is a chance of a storm surge plus sea level rise that is
substantially greater, it is less attractive. So a forecast of 2 meters is very different from a
forecast of 1 to 4 meters with 2 meters as the most likely outcome. Key decision-makers in the
community need to know the range of possible outcomes so they can determine the robustness of
policy decisions. The final decision on whether to build the residential development, and the
maximum it is sensible to pay for the land, will be influenced by the characterization of the risk.
For decisions regarding climate policy, the central importance of uncertainty has long been
recognized. Schneider1 and colleagues were pioneers in posing policy questions in the context of
risk and in introducing conceptual frameworks for managing that risk. Recent research takes a
more formal approach, highlighting the importance of specifying uncertainty as a key policy
input. Worst-case scenarios -- the possibility of extremely costly outcomes with small but
positive probabilities -- can have massive impacts on the cost-benefit analysis of climate change
mitigation, and on the perspectives of key decision-makers. These low-probability highconsequence events have motivated a focus on the tail of the distribution of outcomes2,3. For
example, a 5% chance of a truly unacceptable temperature increase may have a significant
impact when evaluating the expected benefits and costs of climate adaptation and mitigation
policies.
To date, much of the focus in assessments of climate change and its impacts has been on central
tendencies. Uncertainty in future climates is most often represented as the range of outcomes
generated by different climate models run for a range of scenarios. There are, however,
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numerous physical grounds and some observational ones for suspecting that such ensembles of
opportunity may not account for all sources of uncertainty. Some of the open issues relate to the
ways the models are calibrated. Others reflect incomplete understanding of important feedbacks,
like those involving the carbon cycle.
Relatively few studies systematically explore the uncertainty in climate model parameters or
structure. Those studies that have fall into two categories. One set undertakes a large number of
runs using simplified climate models: these typically produce rather broad ranges of uncertainty,
but this may simply reflect the difficulty of using observations to constrain simple models.1 The
other set uses more complex models but much smaller ensembles: these typically give narrower
ranges that may simply reflect inadequate exploration of parameter and structural uncertainty.2
The few studies that use large ensembles and complex models5,6 have found relatively broad
ranges.
Many impact studies use climate forcing from multiple climate models or multiple climate
scenarios but few provide a probability distribution of possible impacts for a given climate
forcing scenario. The result is a striking gap between the available information and the demand
for information framed in the context of risk and uncertainty that form the essential lens through
which the entire issue must be viewed. One possible response to this gap is a greater emphasis
on characterizing well-defined probability density functions (PDFs) as a foundation for policy
advice. There have been many attempts to do this, for example Kolstadt9, Fisher and Narain10, or
for a survey, Heal and Kristrom.11 An alternative is a fundamental change in the focus of future
research and the communication of uncertainty as it relates to climate change, with increased
emphasis on probabilities based on subjective likelihoods of various outcomes.12 The problem
with proposing these probabilities, however, is that they may be divorced from the data
available and may thus appear to be arbitrary.

1

For more details on this point see Yohe, Andronova and Schlesinger4, Piani et al.5 and Rowlands et al.6
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See Shiogama et al.7 and Yokohata et al.8 for more details on these complex models with smaller ensembles.
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A third option, the focus of this paper, is to take advantage of available tools for decision support
that do not depend on information about the entire PDFs for each scenario. Some of the
approaches that evaluate alternatives, such as expected utility theory, cannot deal with situations
with limited or no information on probabilities.

Incorporating Uncertainty in Climate Risk Management
The challenge in evaluating alternative strategies for addressing climate change issues is that
many risk assessments and climate impact studies provide ranges of outcomes, but with
relatively little information on probability distributions. For example, the IPCC AR4 presents
most of its climate model projections based on multi-model ensembles. For line or bar charts,
uncertainty is represented variously as the 5% to 95% range, means ± 1 standard deviation, mean
plus 60% to mean minus 40%, and results of all models plotted individually. For maps of
projected precipitation, multi-model means are shown only where at least 66% of the models
agree on the sign of the change, with stippling indicating areas where 90% of the models agree
on the sign of the change.
A recent report of the IPCC (SREX)14 presents extremes of temperature and precipitation in
terms of future return intervals for the regionally most extreme value in 20 years, showing the
median and the range across 50% and 100% of the models that participated in the multi-model
intercomparison project. While this is a major advance in the presenting probabilistic outcomes,
it is still far from providing complete PDFs.
In the absence of complete PDFs, one way to specify information about the tails of the
distribution is to leave off extremes when the likelihood of an outcome is sufficiently small that
key decision makers feel that they can ignore its consequences. For example, if climate scientists
agree that it is highly unlikely that the global average temperature increase will exceed 6 oC by
2050, then the consequences of this possible outcome would not be considered in choosing
between alternatives. More generally, this process entails specifying a threshold probability and
removing extremes that have lower probabilities in determining risk management strategies for
dealing with climate change.
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Insurers and reinsurers utilize this approach in determining the amount of coverage that they are
willing to offer against a particular risk. They diversify their portfolio of policies to keep the
annual probability of a major loss below some threshold level (e.g., 1 in 1,000).15 This behavior
is in the spirit of a classic paper by Roy16 on safety-first behavior.
Consider our example of the coastal community in Florida reviewing a development at 3 meters
above sea level. One way of evaluating this is to undertake a benefit-cost analysis delineating
climate change scenarios where the construction costs, operating expenses and restoration costs
should it be flooded exceed the expected benefits. If the cumulative probability of these
scenarios is below the required safety level, the facility should be constructed at 3 meters. If
these criteria are not met, then one could repeat the benefit-cost analysis for alternative
adaptation measures such as elevating the facility so its foundation is at 4 meters above sea level.
If there is no adaptation measure where the expected benefit/cost ratio exceeds 1 also meets the
safety first criteria, then the community may not want to build the facility.

Risk Management and Ambiguity
In contrast to risk situations where the probabilities are known, ambiguous (or imprecise)
situations are ones in which the uncertainty about possible outcomes cannot be objectively
characterized by a single well-defined PDF. Individuals and institutions are ambiguity-averse
and will pay a premium to reduce the ambiguity that they face.17,18,19 For example, estimates of
the PDF of equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS, or multi-century time-scale warming in
response to a doubling of atmospheric CO2) differ greatly among approaches and data sets. To
illustrate this point, representative PDFs of ECS are depicted in Figure 1. Estimates of the
probability of ECS exceeding 4.5oC range from less than 2% to over 50% in different studies.20
Milner, Dietz and Heal use this example to show that the impact of such imprecision on decision
processes can be substantial.13
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Figure 1: Estimated probability distributions for (bottom axis) Equilibrium Climate Sensitivity
from various published studies, collated by ref. 16, and (top axis) corresponding concentrations
of CO2 consistent with a long-term CO2-induced warming

C2K  Cpre-industrial exp(ln(2)Tmax / ECS)

Tmax of 2oC, given by the expression

. Current concentrations are 397ppm.

Pursuing this example, the top axis of Figure 1 shows concentrations of CO2 consistent with 2oC
of warming21 corresponding to the values of ECS on the bottom axis. Suppose emissions decay
exponentially at an average rate r, and f is the average future airborne fraction (circa 45% over
recent decades). CO2 concentrations would then increase by a further f/r times current
emissions E0 of about 10 GtC per year (equivalent to 4.7ppm atmospheric CO2). Limiting CO2induced warming to 2oC would therefore require emissions to fall at an average rate of 1.3%/year
(so concentrations rise by a further E0f/r≈160ppm) if ECS is 2oC and 4.4%/year if ECS is 3oC, a
major difference. Uncertainty matters in this range of ECS values. As shown in Figure 1, there is,
however, a high level of consensus across studies that the probability of ECS>3oC is 50% or
more.
6

Meeting the 2oC goal for any value of ECS much greater than 3oC, would require either
offsetting the impact of CO2 with other forcings and/or deploying large-scale negative CO2
emission measures in the future. The scale of these measures will depend not only on the
trajectory of emissions but also on changes in the airborne fraction and climate system response22
which will only become clear when emissions start to fall. Hence the steps required today to
meet the 2oC goal are not qualitatively affected by ambiguity in the shape of the distribution for
ECS above 3oC.
Modeling decision-making under ambiguity requires a framework for rational choice in the
absence of well-defined probabilities. Several have been proposed in the last two decades (see
Gilboa23 for a review). Millner, Dietz and Heal13 work with the framework developed by
Klibanoff et al.24 that separates preferences and subjective beliefs, a hallmark of expected utility
theory. Their model allows one to consider the distributions forecast by several approaches, for
example, the ECS distributions in Figure 1. The authors demonstrate that aversion to ambiguity,
given the different predictions, leads to a greater willingness to invest in climate change
mitigation.

Non-Probabilistic Models for Making Choices
Non-probabilistic approaches to decision-making, including minimax regret25 and maximin26
criteria, described in more detail below, can be applied when the probabilities of possible
outcomes are not known.
The minimax regret approach requires the analyst to identify the regret associated with any
policy. The regret is the difference between the value of the best policy in each state of the world
and the value under the policy actually chosen. The optimal policy choice is that which
minimizes, over all policy choices, the maximum regret (over all states) associated with a policy
choice. Formally, if S is a state, and P a policy choice, P*(S) is the best policy choice conditional
on S being the state, and V(S,P) is the value of choosing policy P if the outcome is S, then the
goal is:





MinP MaxS V  S, P*  S    V  S, P 
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Consider the application of this idea to the example of the Florida community determining
whether or not to permit construction of a residential facility on the coast. To determine the
optimal choice when using the minimax regret model, one first selects possible amounts of storm
surge plus sea level rise and calculates the optimal design of the residential facility for each of
these scenarios. Suppose there are n climate scenarios, and the optimal facility design for
scenario j is labeled j*, j=1….n. For every other possible design of the facility, calculate how
far its outcome diverges in present value from the optimal choice for each climate scenario: this
is the regret for that scenario. The maximum regret is the largest possible divergence between the
outcome from the optimal choice j* for scenario j and the actual outcome over all possible
scenarios if j* is chosen. The chosen option is the one that gives the lowest value of the
maximum regret.
The maximin criterion (Wald26) is far simpler: it involves ranking policies by their worst-case
outcomes; the optimal policy is the one that has the best worst-case outcome. There is no concept
of regret here and so no need to measure the differences between outcomes, but merely to rank
them. It is more demanding to use the minimax regret criterion in that it requires us to compare
differences between outcomes; however, one gains information in the process. Crucially, neither
approach requires relative probabilities to be assigned to the different climate scenarios, although
some threshold would be required to avoid results being dominated by entirely implausible
outcomes.

Robust Decision-Making
Robust decision making (RDM) is a particular set of methods and tools developed over the last
decade to support decision-making and policy analysis under conditions of ambiguity. RDM uses
ranges or, more formally, sets of plausible probability distributions to describe deep uncertainty
that play a role in evaluating alternative strategies for today and the future. In contrast to
expected utility theory, it assesses different strategies on the basis of their robustness rather than
their optimality. In the context of the design of a facility to reduce the likelihood of damage from
storm surge and sea level rise, choosing Design 1* may be optimal based on a specific set of
estimates of the likelihood of each scenario j=1….n occurring. However, Design 2* may have a
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higher expected loss than Design 1* but much less variance in its outcomes, and thus be a
preferred choice by the community.
Lempert et al.27 review the application of a range of robust approaches to decisions with respect
to mitigating or adapting to climate change. A World Resources Institute webpage on Managing
Uncertainty (http://www.worldresourcesreport.org/decision-making-in-depth/managinguncertainty) summarizes several applications of robust decision/non-probabilistic approaches,
each using various types of climate information. These applications include the Thames River
Barrier, energy production in the Niger Basin, water management in Yemen, and flood risk
management in a large southeast Asian metropolis. The examples illustrate how climate
information can be used to identify various thresholds or bounding cases beyond which certain
policies will fail. In some cases robust decision methods generate probability thresholds for
certain scenarios above which a decision maker might choose a different risk management
strategy. This threshold can then be compared to one or more probabilistic estimates from the
literature, such as the study by Hall et al. 28

Conclusions
Studies by the climate science and climate-change impacts communities have provided a range
of possible outcomes of climate change. Formal approaches such as the maximization of
expected utility or benefit-cost analysis are difficult to apply in the presence of ambiguity with
respect to the distribution of future climate scenarios. For most issues relevant to policy choices,
the solution is to utilize more robust approaches to risk management that do not require
unambiguous probabilities. Risk management strategies designed to deal with the uncertainties
that surround projections of climate change and their impacts can thus play an important role in
supporting the development of sound policy options.
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